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Abstract
We define a 0Day vulnerability to be any
vulnerability, in deployed software, that has been
discovered by at least one person but has not yet been
publicly announced or patched. These 0Day
vulnerabilities are of particular interest when
assessing the risk to a system from exploit of
vulnerabilities which are not generally known to the
public or, most importantly, to the owners of the
system.
Using the 0Day definition given above, we
analyzed the 0Day lifespans of 491 vulnerabilities and
conservatively estimated that in the worst year there
were on average 2500 0Day vulnerabilities in
existence on any given day.
Then using a small but intriguing set of 15 0Day
vulnerability lifespans representing the time from
actual discovery to public disclosure, we made a more
aggressive estimate. In this case, we estimated that in
the worst year there were, on average, 4500 0Day
vulnerabilities in existence on any given day.
1. Introduction
Risk to a system is the probability of a negative
event times the consequence of that event, summed
over all possible events. Risk is defined in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan [1] as a function of
consequence, vulnerability, and threat. One category of
vulnerabilities within a system consists of those that
reside in software. Within this category there are the
questions of how many vulnerabilities exist, how well
they are known, how easy they are to exploit, the
resulting privileges that could be gained, and the
damage that could ensue. This paper focuses
specifically on the first two aspects of vulnerabilities
and makes a first order estimate of the total number of
0Day software vulnerabilities which exist at any given
time. We anticipate that with additional work this
estimate will be able to be tailored for supporting an
estimation of the exposure of individual systems from
these relatively unknown vulnerabilities.
A vulnerability in software is “an instance of a
mistake in the specification, development, or
configuration of software such that its execution can
violate the explicit or implicit security policy” [2]. The
rate of vulnerability reporting for individual software
applications has been studied for a number of years
[3,4].
For software, in total, the number of publicly
announced vulnerabilities has changed over the past 8
years from less than 3 per day in 2000 to over 16 per
day in 2008 according to the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [5]. This high rate of vulnerability
announcements has focused attention on the very
practical and immediate issues of patch management
[6], vulnerability disclosure processes [7,8], and speed
of patch generation [9], dissemination, and application.
Unfortunately, this focus has left unattended
important issues which should be considered when
pondering the security of a system consisting of
software as well as hardware. One such issue is the
question of how many software vulnerabilities are in
existence which have been discovered by potential
adversaries, but not yet publicly announced or patched
(i.e. 0Day vulnerabilities). This paper’s primary
contribution is that it proposes and applies a novel
method for making first order estimates of the number
of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day.
There is no generally accepted formal definition
for "0Day (also known as zero-day) vulnerability". The
term has been used to refer to flaws in software that no
one knows about except the attacker. Sometimes the
term is used to mean a vulnerability for which no patch
is yet available. For the purposes of this paper, we
formally define a 0Day vulnerability as any
vulnerability, in deployed software, that has been
discovered by at least one person but has not yet been
publicly announced or patched. These 0Day
vulnerabilities are of particular interest in well
managed systems which have effectively mitigated the
publicly known vulnerabilities. In these well managed
systems the risk contribution from 0Days will have
proportionally increased. To aid understanding of how
great a risk the 0Days may pose to a system, an
estimate of how many are in existence is needed.
Using the 0Day definition given above, we
developed and applied a method for estimating how
many 0Day vulnerabilities are in existence on any
given day. The estimate is made by: empirically
characterizing the distribution of the lifespans,
measured in days, of 0Day vulnerabilities; determining
the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced each
day; and applying a novel method for estimating the
number of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any
given day using the number of vulnerabilities publicly
announced each day and the previously derived
distribution of 0Day lifespans.
In this paper we first make use of 491
vulnerabilities, using the time they were privately
reported to a vendor until their public announcement as
a conservative stand-in for their lifespan as 0Days.
After characterizing these lifespans we proceed to
estimate how many 0Days existed on each given day in
the past.
We then make a more aggressive estimate of 0Day
lifespans by discarding the 491 vulnerabilities
mentioned above, and using a small set of 15 0Day
vulnerabilities for which we knew the actual date of
discovery along with the date of public announcement.
As expected, the lifespans of these 15 vulnerabilities
were, on average, quite a bit longer than those of the
previous 491 vulnerabilities. Consequently, the new
aggressive estimate of how many 0Days exist on each
day in the past is significantly higher.
Finally, given the estimations for the number of
0Day vulnerabilities and their lifespans, we looked at
whether the risk to a system from 0Days might be less
than the raw number estimates would indicate. We
tentatively discovered that the more serious the
vulnerability the longer its lifespan tended to be and
thus the risk to systems appears to actually be greater
than the 0Day estimates would indicate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses a vulnerability’s lifecycle and
provides context for the discussion of 0Day
vulnerabilities. Section 3 characterizes the 0Day
lifespan of 491 vulnerabilities. Section 4 describes and
applies a method for estimating the number of 0Day
vulnerabilities in existence at each day in the past.
Section 5 is a recalculation of the number of 0Day
vulnerabilities in existence making use of a small set of
15 0Day vulnerabilities. Section 6 is a discussion of a
potential relationship between 0Day lifespans and their
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Figure 1. Vulnerability Lifecycle.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base
scores [10]. Sections 7 and 8 present our conclusions
and discuss future work.
2. 0Day Vulnerability Lifecycle
The lifecycle of a vulnerability, from its creation
until a patch is released and applied, or the software
retired is illustrated in Figure 1. The red box in Figure
1 represents the start of a 0Day vulnerability lifespan
while the blue boxes represent events that end the
lifespan. A 0Day vulnerability only exists during the
part of the lifecycle which starts with discovery and
ends with it either being patched, the software retired,
or it being publicly announced. Note that a
vulnerability could, concurrently, remain at multiple
stages of the lifecycle for an indefinite amount of time,
not necessarily changing state.
The lifecycle represented in Figure 1 is described
more fully in the next sections (sections 2.1 through
2.8).
2.1 Vulnerability Created and Deployed
A vulnerability’s life begins when it is written into
software by a developer using unsafe functions, not
checking input data, etc. After a vulnerability is created
and the software deployed, a vulnerability may be
accidentally patched before it has been discovered (e.g.
an undiscovered buffer overflow may no longer be
reachable with a long enough string because a patch
was developed and deployed to truncate the users input
before writing to a database), stay hidden for the entire
life of the software, or get discovered and become a
0Day.
2.2 Vulnerability Discovered
Once the vulnerability is deployed as part of the
released software it may be discovered by a user of the
software, “white hat” vulnerability researcher, or
“black hat” hacker. After being discovered, the
vulnerability, which is now 0Day, may or may not be
exploited. It is possible that the discovery is made by
the vendor and is then patched before it can be
rediscovered and exploited.
2.3 Vulnerability Exploited
After being discovered a vulnerability may be
exploited, depending on who discovered the
vulnerability and for what purposes. If the discoverer
chooses to keep it secret in order to exploit the
vulnerability or sell it to others for exploitation, it may
be rediscovered by multiple people.
The vulnerability may also be exploited by
multiple groups, remaining a 0Day until it is reported
to the vendor and patched, the software becomes
obsolete, or it is publicly announced without vendor
notification.
2.4 Vulnerability Reported to Vendor
When discovered, the vulnerability becomes a
0Day. Responsible disclosure involves reporting the
vulnerability directly to the vendor so that they have an
opportunity to develop a patch, or work around, before
it is publicly announced. After a vendor has received
notification, a vulnerability may be publicly announced
before the vendor has developed a solution; the vendor
may develop and release a patch; or the vendor may
keep the vulnerability confidential and let obsolescence
solve the problem.
2.5 Patch Developed for Vulnerability
If a vulnerability is discovered during testing,
before the software is released, it may be fixed.
However, the early discovery of a vulnerability does
not necessarily lead to its being patched because
sometimes it is determined that rewriting the code base
to address a vulnerability is not cost effective. If the
vulnerability is fixed during the testing stage then the
vulnerability will never be deployed and its brief life is
over. Note that this part of a vulnerability’s lifecycle is
not shown in Figure 1.
It is possible that a vulnerability is patched
inadvertently during a software revision process before
it has been discovered. At this point, its life is over as
long as no vulnerable versions of the software are still
in use.
If the vulnerability belongs to software that has
been released and is still in use, it is a 0Day until it is
publicly announced or a patch is released and applied.
2.6 Vulnerability Publicly Announced
Responsible disclosure allows the vendor to have a
patch available to release as part of a public
announcement, e.g. Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday.
Otherwise, the vendor is informed at the same time the
vulnerability is publicly announced, allowing public
exploitation of the vulnerability while a patch is
developed and deployed.
For sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we define the
0Day lifespan to be the time between when the
vulnerability is reported to the vendor and when it is
publicly announced. During this time period, the
vulnerability is still a 0Day by the definition above
even though the vendor is aware of it, because it has
not been publicly announced.
2.7 Patch Released and Applied to
Vulnerability
If the released and applied patch addresses a 0Day,
the 0Day’s life is over. Sometimes a patch is released
and applied that fixes a vulnerability which has not
been announced. Unfortunately, a new vulnerability
may also be created during the patch process.
It is possible that upon patch release, the patch is
reverse engineered and the vulnerability rediscovered
by a different security research group. This process
may even be automated in some cases to include
automated generation of an exploit [11]. However, this
possibility is not considered in this paper since we are,
for the sake of exposition, making the simplifying
assumption that once a patch is released that it has
been uniformly applied and the vulnerability no longer
exists. This simplifying assumption will be removed in
our later 0Day research.
2.8 Software Obsolete
It is possible that a 0Day is never reported and
therefore its lifetime only ends when the vulnerability
software is no longer in use. This lifetime is not
addressed in this research.
2.9 0Day Lifespans
By our definition, a 0Day vulnerability is one
which has been discovered but has not yet been
publicly announced or fixed. This represents the real
lifespan of the 0Day. Unfortunately, the actual date of
vulnerability discovery is not usually available. The
NVD database has "discovery date" records for a small
fraction of its entries, and for many of those entries the
"discovery date" is the same or nearly the same date as
the "publication date". For those cases it is highly
unlikely that the recorded "discovery date" is a valid
start date for a 0Day vulnerability lifespan.
Consequently, in sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we use
the time between reporting a 0Day vulnerability to the
vendor and its public announcement as a conservative
estimate of the actual 0Day’s lifespan. In section 5 we
make a potentially more realistic estimate of the
lifespan using 15 vulnerability data points where the
actual discovery date was known.
3. Estimate of 0Day Vulnerability
Lifespans
In the 0Day vulnerability lifecycle discussed in the
previous section, the time from vendor notification of
the vulnerability to its public announcement is but a
portion of the overall lifetime of a 0Day vulnerability
and is referred to in section 3 and 4 of this paper as its
lifespan. This section will describe our work in
characterizing these 0Day lifespans.
3.1 Sources of 0Day Lifespan Information
In August, 2005 TippingPoint formed the Zero
Day Initiative (ZDI). In TippingPoint’s own words
“The main goals of the ZDI are to:
• Extend our DVLabs research team by
leveraging the methodologies, expertise, and
time of others
• Encourage the reporting of zero day
vulnerabilities responsibly to the affected
vendors by financially rewarding researchers
• Protect our customers through the
TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention
Systems(IPS) while the affected vendor is
working on a patch”.
The second bullet is what is of most interest to us
since it led ZDI to offering cash incentives to security
researchers for the reporting of 0Day vulnerabilities to
ZDI.
The process followed by ZDI when offered a 0Day
vulnerability is to validate the vulnerability, attempt to
negotiate a deal with the researcher, and, if a deal is
reached, report the vulnerability to the vendor. When
the vendor has developed a patch there is a coordinated
public announcement about the vulnerability. The
vulnerability details and the disclosure time line are
then posted online. The difference between the report
to vendor date and the public announcement date found
in the disclosure time line may be used as an estimate
of the lifespan of the 0Day vulnerability.
In May 1998 iDefense Labs (iDefense) was
founded. Their business is to provide clients with
leading edge intelligence on vulnerabilities and threats.
iDefense efforts include the Vulnerability Contributor
Program which is used to acquire 0Day vulnerabilities.
They post online a list of all of their acquired 0Day
vulnerabilities which have been made public. For each
vulnerability the posting includes a description and
analysis along with a disclosure timeline. The iDefense
disclosure timeline includes the date the vulnerability
was reported to the vendor and the date it was
announced to the public. These two dates are the same
information captured by ZDI so may also be used as an
estimate of the lifespan of the 0Day vulnerability.
While other dates, such as the date in which the
vulnerability was reported to ZDI or iDefense, are
occasionally available for the 0Day vulnerabilities, we
used the date reported to vendor and the date of
announcement to the public in order to be consistent.
Using these two data sources, we collected
vulnerability postings from January 5, 2006 through
August 16, 2007 and analyzed the lifespans of the 309
0Day vulnerabilities. Due to higher priority
commitments we were then forced to set this research
aside until May 22 of 2008. At that time we
reconstituted our work and collected vulnerability
postings from the two data sources for August 17, 2007
through May 22, 2008, and then analyzed the lifespans
of the 182 new 0Day vulnerabilities. This provided a
total of 491 0Day vulnerabilities for analysis.
We were concerned about the possibility that the
statistics of the 0Day vulnerabilities might have
dramatically changed between the first collection of
data and the second collection period, or that the
statistics might be significantly different between the
two sources of data due to some unknown differences
in the underlying environment. Consequently, we
initially kept the four sets of vulnerabilities separated
for individual comparison. The four sets are “ZDI
OLD”, “ZDI NEW”, “iDefense OLD”, and “iDefense
NEW”. ZDI OLD and iDefense OLD consist of the
0Day vulnerability advisories, posted on ZDI and
iDefense respectively, during the first data collection
period. ZDI NEW and iDefense NEW consist of the
0Day vulnerability advisories, posted on ZDI and
iDefense respectively, during the second collection
period.
3.2 Characterizing 491 0Day Lifespans
When characterizing the 491 lifespans, four
important questions were considered. The first was
whether the mean and standard deviation of the
lifespans from the four 0Day vulnerability data sets
were similar; the second was whether, as a first order
approximation, the lifespans could be reasonably
characterized using a log-normal distribution; the third
question was whether the underlying population
distribution of vulnerability lifespans was stable over
time; and the fourth question was whether the lifespans
from ZDI and iDefense came from the same
underlying population of vulnerability lifespans. The
rest of this section answers those four questions.
3.2.1 Mean and Standard deviation of 0Day
Lifespans. The calculated means and standard
deviations of the four vulnerability data sets may be
seen in Table 1. The largest mean for lifespans was
169.81 days (ZDI NEW) and the smallest was 112.74
days (ZDI OLD). The largest standard deviation was
153.21 days (iDefense OLD). The mean and standard
deviations of the data sets which were formed by
combining the ZDI data into one set, the iDefense data
into another set, and combining all of the data together
may also be found in Table 1. The means for each of
these three combined data sets are very close to each
other, approximately 130 days.
Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviation of
0Day Lifespans.
Vuln.
Data Set
Vuln.
Count
Days:
Mean
Lifespan
Days:
STD
ZDI OLD 100 112.74 76.13
ZDI NEW 63 169.81 145.57
iDefense OLD 209 125.11 153.21
iDefense NEW 119 139.47 138.33
ZDI
COMBINED 163 134.80 111.49
iDefense
COMBINED 328 130.32 147.93
All-Data
COMBINED 491 131.81 136.81
For each data set, including the combined sets, the
lifespans were placed in bins 25 days wide. We then
plotted the vulnerability counts against lifespans. As an
example, see Figure 2 for the plot of the four data sets
combined. When visually inspecting the lifespan plot
in Figure 2, and each of the other plots as well, it
seemed possible that the lifespans might be log-
normally distributed.
3.2.2 Modeling Lifespans Using a Log-normal
Distribution. If the lifespan of a 0Day vulnerability is
thought of as the outcome of the discoverer’s unique
set of attributes, each vendor’s patch development
process, the individual vendor’s economic factors at any
moment, the difficulty of patching, and the particular
individuals involved in creating the patch then a log-
normal distribution [12] may be an appropriate model.
To determine how well a log-normal distribution
would model the distribution of lifespans in the various
0Day vulnerability data sets, the natural log was taken
of each lifespan and placed in bins 0.5 wide. Then the
count of vulnerabilities were plotted against the log
values. The plot for all of the data sets combined is
shown in Figure 3. Visually, to varying degrees, each
of the log plots seemed to have a Gaussian distribution.
To quantitatively determine the goodness of fit of
the log-normal distribution to the lifespan data the
mean of the log values and the corresponding standard
deviations were calculated for each of the original four
data sets, the combined ZDI data, the combined
iDefense data, and all of the data combined. For each
data set this information was then used to calculate the
R2 value which roughly represents how well the
vulnerability lifespan distributions of the set are
represented by a log-normal distribution. The closer R2
is to 1 the better the fit.
The results of these calculations are shown in
Table 2. From this we surmise that modeling the
lifespans as a log-normal distribution is a reasonable
first order estimate of the 0Day vulnerability
distributions found in the data sets. We recognize that
other distributions, such as the Poisson, might yield
improved lifespan models and understanding of
underlying causes, but those possibilities will be
evaluated in later research.
Modeling the lifespans of each data set as a log-
normal distribution leads to the question of whether the
underlying population of 0Day lifespans stays constant
over time and whether the ZDI data sets and the
iDefense data sets represent samples from the same
population.
Table 2. Mean, Standard Deviation, and R2
Values for 0Day Lifespans.
Vuln.
Data Set
Vuln.
Count
LN: Mean
Lifespan
LN:
STD
R2
ZDI OLD 100 4.4802 0.7642 0.7547
ZDI NEW 63 4.7878 0.8662 0.6602
iDefense
OLD
209 4.2740 1.0967 0.8942
iDefense
NEW
119 4.5839 0.8665 0.8657
ZDI
Combined
163 4.5991 0.8165 0.9067
iDefense
Combined
328 4.3864 1.0287 0.921
AllData
Combined
491 4.4570 0.9678 0.9157
3.2.3 Stability of Lifespan Distributions. In order to
determine the likelihood that the means of the logs of
the four vulnerability data sets came from the same
underlying distribution the t-test was performed on
each pair of vulnerability sets. The results are shown in
Table 3. Corresponding to the t-value is the p-value
which represents the chance that the actual measured
means of the two data sets are due to them both
actually having the same mean value (our null
hypothesis). The table shows that when comparing ZDI
OLD with ZDI NEW there is a well over 95% (1-
0.0163) confidence that the mean of the underlying
ZDI vulnerability distribution changed over time (or
there is a changed bias in the sampling process used by
ZDI). A similar statement may be made of the
underlying iDefense 0Day vulnerability lifespan
distribution by inspecting the p-value when comparing
iDefense OLD with iDefense NEW. Thus, for ongoing
estimates of 0Day lifespans, it may be important to
continually collect the 0Day statistics as reported at
ZDI and iDefense. Longer term 0Day vulnerability
data collection, and analysis of the processes used by
ZDI and iDefense are needed to more fully understand
the apparent change in 0Day lifespans.
Table 3 also shows with high confidence that the
ZDI 0Day vulnerability data sets are not being drawn
from the same underlying population as the iDefense
vulnerability data sets (or there are different selection
biases being imposed by the two firms). Further
exploration of the specific processes used by ZDI and
iDefense are needed before drawing any firm
conclusions.
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Figure 2. Lifespan of the Four Combined
Data Sets.
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Figure 3. Log Scale Plot of the Four
Combined Data Sets.
4. Estimation of 0Day Vulnerabilities in
Existence
The number of 0Day vulnerabilities that existed on
a specific date in the past was estimated using the
publication dates from the NVD and a model for 0Day
lifespan as described above in section 3. The estimated
number is simply a count of all the vulnerabilities with
a vendor notification date less than the date of interest
and a public announcement date greater than the date
of interest. The vendor notification date of each
announced vulnerability is calculated by projecting
backward in time from the publication date based on a
sample lifespan selected from one of the 0Day lifespan
log-normal distributions. This process is repeated
multiple times and the result is averaged to obtain the
statistical mean. Figure 4 is the pseudo code for the
initial method used to obtain estimates for all dates
since the earliest NVD vulnerability was published
(October 1988). Notice that this method tends to
underestimate the number of 0Days in existence for
dates near the present day because the number of
published vulnerabilities for future dates is unknown.
Figure 5 shows the initial method’s results using
three different lifespan models from Table 1 (ZDI
NEW, ZDI OLD and AllData COMBINED). The
results are the average of 1000 runs. The shapes of the
graphs are similar for the three different lifespan
models. The graphs show several sharp drops in the
estimated number of 0Days. The sharp drops are
caused by the irregular nature of the publication dates
from NVD. For example, there were a large number of
vulnerabilities publically announced on December 31
for each of the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. (798 on
Dec. 31 2002, 441 on Dec. 31 2003 and 1113 on Dec.
31 2004). On those dates the estimated number of
0Day vulnerabilities has a large reduction because the
estimation method treats a large number of
publications as an immediate drop in the number of
0Days in the pipeline. Based on the Combined results
shown in Figure 5, it is reasonable to estimate the
number of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any
given day during 2006 to be around 2500.
We compared the estimates obtained for log-
normal vulnerability lifespan distribution models to
estimates obtained using a simpler model where the
0Day lifespan is assumed to be a constant value. Figure
6 shows a comparison between the ZDI NEW log-
normal distribution model versus a constant 169 day
lifespan model (169 days is the average lifespan for the
ZDI NEW data set). The comparison shows that this
simpler model produces estimates that are a reasonably
good approximation to the results obtained from the
log-normal distribution model.
The simplest method we used for estimating the
number of existing 0Day vulnerabilities is the average
lifespan of the chosen model multiplied by the average
daily vulnerability public announcement rate. Figure 7
is a comparison of this method with the initial method
described earlier. The ZDI NEW log-normal lifespan
distribution model using the initial estimation method
is plotted along with this simple method. The daily
average public announcement rate is calculated once
per year and is averaged over the succeeding 365 days.
The estimate is the daily average multiplied by 169
days (the average lifespan for the ZDI NEW data set).
This comparison indicates that the simple method
Table 3. t-test On the Four 0Day Vulnerability Lifespan Data Sets.
ZDI OLD ZDI NEW iDefense OLD iDefense NEW
t, p t p t p t p t p
ZDI OLD 0 1.00 2.4254 0.0163 1.7596 0.0794 -0.957 0.3396
ZDI NEW -2.4254 0.0163 0 1.00 -3.4105 0.0007 1.5107 0.1326
iDefense OLD -1.7596 0.0794 3.4105 0.0007 0 1.00 2.6472 0.0085
iDefense NEW 0.957 0.3396 -1.5107 0.1326 -2.6472 0.0085 0 1.00
Figure 4. Pseudo code for 0Day
vulnerability estimation algorithm.
M = number of Monte Carlo runs
N = number of calendar days in National
Vulnerability Database (10/1/1988 to present)
for k = 1 to N
count[k] = 0
date[k] = calendar date for consecutive days
for m = 1 to M
for i = 1 to N
P = number of vulnerabilities published on
day i
for j = 1 to P
r = sample from 0Day lifespan
distribution model (in days)
x = maximum( 1, i - r)
for k = x to (i -1)
count[k] = count[k] +1
for i = 1 to N
avg[i] = count[i] /M
print date[i] , avg[i]
Figure 5. Estimated number of 0Day vulnerabilities using NVD public announcement dates
and three cases of log-normal distribution for lifespan.
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provides a first order approximation that is comparable
to the other more complex methods and models.
5. Modified Estimation of 0Day
vulnerabilities in Existence
The 0Day estimations discussed in the previous
section were based on a lifespan that begins with
vendor notification and ends with a public
announcement. However, this represents only a portion
of the true lifespan which actually begins with
vulnerability discovery. Unfortunately, the date of
initial discovery is usually not known nor as well
documented as the vendor notification date. As
explained in section 2.9, the NVD database has
"discovery date" records for a small fraction of its
entries, and for the cases where there is a recorded
Figure 6. Estimated number of 0Day vulnerabilities using NVD public announcement dates
and log-normal distribution for lifespan (ZDI NEW) compared to constant 169-days lifespan.
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discovery date, the validity of the data is suspect,
therefore "discovery date" data from the NVD database
could not be used to estimate 0Day lifespan.
A small but intriguing set of 15 vulnerability
lifespans was supplied to us by a research group that
does vulnerability discovery. We cannot disclose the
identity of the research group, and there is no evidence
that these 15 lifespans are representative of all 0Day
vulnerabilities. However, these lifespans were included
in our study because they are the elapsed time from
actual discovery date to public announcement date.
These same 15 vulnerabilities were also discovered
independently and publicly disclosed by a different
research group, which provides some added assurance
that the lifespan data is valid. Figure 8 is a histogram
that shows the lifespan data for these 15 vulnerabilities.
The average 0Day lifespan for these 15 vulnerabilities
is 256 days and the median lifespan is 200 days. As
expected, the average lifespan is larger than the
lifespans discussed in the previous sections and would
be expected to result in larger estimates for the number
of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence.
The 15 lifespans described above were used to
estimate the number of 0Day vulnerabilities in
existence. The estimates were calculated using the
NVD public announcement dates and the method in
Figure 4 but with lifespan samples obtained by a
uniform random selection from the 15 lifespans. The
results are shown in Figure 9. The results show that the
new estimate for the worst year (2006) is about 4500
0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day.
This is a less conservative estimate than the results
from the previous section and since the lifespan dataset
is small it should not be considered a high confidence
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Figure 8. Fifteen 0Day life spans from
discovery to public announcement.
Figure 7. Estimated number of 0Day vulnerabilities using NVD public announcement
dates and log-normal distribution of lifespan (ZDI NEW) compared to average rate times
169-days. Average rate is the number of announced vulnerabilities per day averaged
over the succeeding 365 days.
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estimate. However, since these 15 lifespans begin at
the moment of discovery rather than the vendor
notification date, this estimate could very well be more
realistic.
6. CVSS Base Score and 0Day Lifespans
Given the estimations of the number of 0Day
vulnerabilities and their lifespans it is important to ask
whether the estimates may be misleading about the risk
0Days pose. If the lifespans are very long for low
impact, difficult to exploit, vulnerabilities but very
short for high impact, easy to exploit, vulnerabilities
then the risk would be lower than the raw numbers lead
us to believe. To evaluate this possibility we used the
405 0Day vulnerabilities from ZDI and iDefense which
had a CVSS Base score assignment, and broke them
into categories based on their score. CVSS is an
industry standard for assessing the severity of
computer system security vulnerabilities.
The CVSS Base score consists of a weighting of
the impact and exploitability subscores. The impact
subscore is an evaluation of the potential impact to
confidentiality, integrity, and availability from
exploitation of the vulnerability. The exploitability
subscore is an assessment of the complexity of actual
exploitation. This includes measures such as whether
the attacker may exploit the vulnerability remotely,
how complex the actual attack process is expected to
be, and the required number of authentications during
attack execution. Details of the CVSS Base score may
be found in the CVSS scoring guide [10].
We expected to find that the vulnerabilities which
are easily exploitable and have a high impact (very
high CVSS Base scores) would have significantly
shorter lifespans since it would seem to be in the
software owner’s and vendor’s interest to have the
vendor devote their limited resources to fixing them
quickly.
Table 4. Mean Lifespans Using Two
CVSS Base Score Categories.
LOW CVSS
0.0 – 7.9
Vuln.
COUNTS
MEAN
LIFESPAN
ZDI OLD 45 90.0889
ZDI NEW 22 181.9545
iDefense 102 100.4216
iDefense 57 118.7719
ALL
DATA
Combined
226 110.9292
HIGH CVSS
8.0 – 10.0
Vuln.
COUNTS
MEAN
LIFESPAN
ZDI OLD 53 130.8491
ZDI NEW 34 164.8824
iDefense 31 145.9032
iDefense 60 142.5500
ALL
DATA
Combined
178 143.9157
The initial analysis results may be seen in Table 4.
We were surprised to see that the mean lifespans of the
most severe vulnerabilities (CVSS Base scores 8-10)
were actually longer than for the less serious
vulnerabilities in three out of the four vulnerability
data sets. Upon investigation of the exception we found
in ZDI NEW, we discovered that the higher average
lifespan value in the low severity category was due to a
single vulnerability with a CVSS Base score of 7.8 and
a very long lifespan. It is interesting to note that with
all of the 0Day vulnerability data sets combined, the
mean lifespan of the high severity vulnerabilities are
about 30% longer than the low severity cases. This is
just the opposite of what would be hoped for from a
security perspective.
Rather than use the two, somewhat ad-hoc, CVSS
Base score categories found in Table 4, we decided
that for the sake of validation and completeness we
would do the same analysis as before but make use of
the low, medium, and high severity categories as
formally defined in the CVSS documentation. This
change lead to the categories and analysis results seen
in Table 5. In this case all four data sets show a longer
lifespan for the high severity vulnerabilities, and the
combined data set shows that the medium severity
vulnerabilities have a lifespan approximately 20%
longer than the low severity vulnerabilities and the
Figure 9. Estimated number of 0Day
vulnerabilities using NVD public
announcement dates and statistics of
15 discovery to announcement.
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high severity vulnerabilities have a lifespan
approximately 20% longer than those of medium
severity.
Table 5. Mean Lifespans by CVSS
Standard Base Score Categories.
Low CVSS Base Score
(CVSS 0.0 - 3.9)
VULN.
COUNTS
MEAN
LIFESPAN
ZDI OLD 0 0.0000
ZDI NEW 0 0.0000
iDefense OLD 7 101.8571
iDefense NEW 1 13.0000
ALL DATA
Combined 8 90.7500
Medium CVSS Base Score
(CVSS 4.0 - 6.9)
VULN.
COUNTS
MEAN
LIFESPAN
ZDI OLD 16 106.5000
ZDI NEW 16 146.6875
iDefense OLD 57 95.2982
iDefense NEW 26 123.1538
ALL DATA
Combined 115 110.3043
High CVSS Base Score
(CVSS 7.0 - 10.0)
VULN.
COUNTS
MEAN
LIFESPAN
ZDI OLD 82 113.2317
ZDI NEW 40 181.5500
iDefense OLD 69 124.9420
iDefense NEW 90 134.5333
ALL DATA
Combined 281 132.6548
The tentative conclusion from this analysis is
that the previous estimates for the number and
lifespans of 0Day vulnerabilities may actually
underestimate the risk since the estimates don’t
account for the extended lifespans of the more severe
vulnerabilities.
However, more investigation is needed. The
question of 0Days with high CVSS base scores having
longer lifespans may simply be an artifact of the data
we used, or it may be real and be caused by some
hidden attribute of the process such as a greater
difficulty in developing patches for the more serious
vulnerabilities.
7. Conclusions
We demonstrated a method for estimating the
number of past 0Day vulnerabilities. In the worst year
(2006) we conservatively estimated that there was an
average of 2500 0Days in existence on any given day.
Using a much smaller vulnerability data set, but one
where the calculated vulnerability lifespans ranged
from the moment of discovery to the date of public
announcement, we more aggressively estimated that
there was an average of 4500 0Day vulnerabilities in
existence on any given day during the worst year
(2006). These estimates are first order approximations
that are subject to change as more data becomes
available.
We also provided preliminary evidence that the
most serious of these 0Day vulnerabilities have longer
lifespans than lower severity vulnerabilities.
Consequently, 0Day vulnerabilities appear to represent
a greater risk to our systems than even the estimated
number of 0Day vulnerabilities would indicate.
8. Future Work
We are pursuing investigation into a variety of
issues related to estimating both the past and current
number of 0Day vulnerabilities, the risk they may pose
to a variety of systems, and potential mitigations. The
work includes the modification and application of the
research described in this paper to individual software
programs. This will then be followed by an
investigation in applying the attack surface metric
concept to systems.
Further, critical infrastructure control systems
make use of many programs which are not pervasive
and thus they have not undergone the vigorous assault
of the larger security research community.
Consequently the vulnerability data related to control
system software is expected to require a modified
approach for characterizing the lifespans and for
estimating the number of 0Day vulnerabilities.
Of course the risk posed to systems from 0Day
attacks rest not just on the number of 0Day
vulnerabilities but also on how easy it is to acquire the
desired vulnerability. The ease of acquisition is
impacted not just by how many potential attackers are
aware of it, but also by the markets available for both
buying and selling the 0Day vulnerabilities. This
impact will be investigated.
Also, the number of 0Day vulnerabilities and
their lifespans may impact the form of an optimal
disclosure process which minimizes the risk window,
particularly to our most sensitive critical infrastructure
systems. Thus, the relation of 0Days to control system
vulnerability disclosure will be investigated.
The question of 0Days with high CVSS Base
scores having longer lifespans will also be investigated
further to determine whether it is simply an artifact of
the data we used, whether it relates to the difficulty in
developing patches for the more serious vulnerabilities,
or whether the more significant vulnerabilities are
more closely guarded by the discoverer.
We are in the process of acquiring many more
0Day vulnerability discovery and public announcement
dates from firms and individuals who make the
discovery themselves. This data will be used to create
an improved estimate of the lifespan of a 0Day
vulnerability from initial discovery to public
announcement.
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